Artificial intelligence methods including deep neural networks (DNN) can provide rapid molecular classification of tumors from routine histology with accuracy that matches or exceeds human pathologists. Discerning how neural networks make their predictions remains a significant challenge, but explainability tools help provide insights into what models have learned when corresponding histologic features are poorly defined. Here, we present a method for improving explainability of DNN models using synthetic histology generated by a conditional generative adversarial network (cGAN). We show that cGANs generate high-quality synthetic histology images that can be leveraged for explaining DNN models trained to classify molecularly-subtyped tumors, exposing histologic features associated with molecular state. Fine-tuning synthetic histology through class and layer blending illustrates nuanced morphologic differences between tumor subtypes. Finally, we demonstrate the use of synthetic histology for augmenting pathologist-in-training education, showing that these intuitive visualizations can reinforce and improve understanding of histologic manifestations of tumor biology.

Advancements in reinforcement learning (RL) have inspired new directions in intelligent automation of network defense. However, many of these advancements have either outpaced their application to network security or have not considered the challenges associated with implementing them in the real-world. To understand these problems, this work evaluates several RL approaches implemented in the second edition of the CAGE Challenge, a public competition to build an autonomous network defender agent in a high-fidelity network simulator. Our approaches all build on the Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) family of algorithms, and include hierarchical RL, action masking, custom training, and ensemble RL. We find that the ensemble RL technique performs strongest, outperforming our other models and taking second place in the competition. To understand applicability to real environments we evaluate each method's ability to generalize to unseen networks and against an unknown attack strategy. In unseen environments, all of our approaches perform worse, with degradation varied based on the type of environmental change. Against an unknown attacker strategy, we found that our models had reduced overall performance even though the new strategy was less efficient than the ones our models trained on. Together, these results highlight promising research directions for autonomous network defense in the real world.